Return to Life and Reconstruct Confucianism

黄玉顺

Front. Philos. China 2007, 2 (3) : 454–473

DOI 10.1007/s11466-007-0029-8 

HUANG Yushun

Return to Life and Reconstruct Confucianism:

An Outline of a Comparative Study on Confucianism and Phenomenology
 

? Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2007 

Abstract Confucianism can be analyzed at three levels of ideas: life as existence (Sein) itself; the Confucian metaphysics about metaphysical beings; and the Confucian doctrines about tangible existences. In the eyes of Confucians, life itself is displayed as the feeling of benevolence in the first place. To reconstruct Confucianism is to return to life and perceive it as a fundamental source. That means to historically return to the original Confucianism during and even before the Axial Period, in essence it is to simultaneously return to our immediate life itself, and then on this basis to reconstruct both Confucian metaphysics and Confucian doctrines about tangible existences.

Keywords Chinese philosophy, Confucianism, phenomenology, comparative study

Translated by Huang Deyuan from Renwen Zazhi 人文杂志 (Humanistic Magazine), 2005, (6): 27–35

HUANG Yushun (??)

Philosophy Department, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China

E-mail: [email protected]

1 Introduction
This essay intends to bring forward a preliminary outline of research: to return to life and reconstruct Confucianism in the context of contemporary thoughts by means of a comparative study on Confucianism and phenomenology. This subject is brought forward due to the following concerns.

2 Several issues concerned
2.1 Do we need to reconstruct metaphysics today?

We are at a so-called “post-modern” time, which is said to be an age of “post-metaphysics” and an age when all the attempts to establish a system of metaphysics are frustrated. Here, “metaphysics” refers to the so-called “pure philosophy”, that is, the traditional ontology in a general sense. According to Heidegger, philosophy is nothing but metaphysics, which is to seek a final ground for all beings, therefore displays itself in seeking the beings as a whole or the beings as beings (Heidegger, 1999a, p. 76). This “anti-metaphysics” tendency is somewhat reasonable, for the traditional metaphysics did lack the fountainhead of understanding and interpretation of Being as its foundation. However, I think this refusal of “metaphysics” is not only wrong but also impossible.

First, academically, metaphysics is not only a foundation of sciences, but also a foundation of ethics. From the point of view of phenomenology, metaphysics as an ontology of pure philosophy is a basis for the construction of sciences and ethics although it has to be based on pure a priori consciousness (by Husserl) or the fountainhead of understanding and interpretation of Being (Heidegger). According to Husserl, the task of metaphysics is to confirm and verify the unobserved or even often unnoticed but critical metaphysical premises that usually constitute foundations of the sciences which explore all the concrete realities (Husserl, 1994, p. 7). Heidegger carried forward this idea in a certain sense, and hence raised the question how metaphysics itself laid its foundations. He distinguished the laying of foundations at two levels: the fundamental ontology laid a foundation for the traditional ontology, and the philosophy of traditional ontology for “sciences”. In his opinion, the issue of Being aimed at not only guaranteeing the a priori conditions for sciences to be possible, but also ensuring the conditions that made ontology that precedes all the sciences and serves as a foundation for the sciences in question possible (Heidegger, 1999b, p. 13). As it shows, Heidegger actually thought that there existed such a relationship of foundations: ontology (fundamental ontology) → philosophical ontology (metaphysics) → sciences and ethics. According to Heidegger, ethics, which discloses argumentatively a certain field of beings, is also a kind of science (Heidegger, 2000). Therefore, if we gave up our attempt of metaphysics on our own, the sciences would develop by themselves and would become an uncontrolled wild horse; likewise, ethical life would continue its course, but it would be unrestrained “ethics”.

Second, from the perspective of realities, it is true that the collapse of metaphysics would not only let the unscrupulous scientism alone to do whatever it wants, but also lead to the overrun of relativism in ethical life. The modern ethical life in the West has been coordinated by two kinds of ethics: animal ethics and religious ethics. The so-called religious ethics refers to the traditional ethics of Christianity, and the animal ethics means the fundamental spirit of modernism: a human being is an animal that has desires and reason, therefore able to reasonably seek interests and evade harms. This idea is a typical representation of the jungle morals of Social Darwinism. However, in China, the Chinese people had understood themselves as animals that “compete to survive” and consequently rejected or destroyed the systems of their traditional metaphysics and ethics since Yan Fu translated the Evolution. Then, does animal life involve morals? Confucians think that the “subsistence” of animals is ethical only when it co-exists with the existence of human beings. Therefore, the responsibility of thinkers today is not to oppose metaphysics, but to lay a cornerstone for it (Heidegger, 1996).

Third, in fact, almost all the anti-metaphysical thoughts, including some postmodern ones, have also their own metaphysics. For example, “anti-metaphysics” began with the “refusal of metaphysics” in analytic philosophy, but still the analytic philosophy has its own metaphysics, which Quine has shyly admitted at last through his “ontological commitment” (Quine, 1987, p. 8).

2.2 Do we still need to reconstruct Confucianism today?

When speaking of laying a foundation for metaphysics or reconstructing metaphysics, Chinese thinkers will naturally think of the reconstruction of Confucianism. Here come the questions, of course: although the construction of Confucianism will certainly mean that of metaphysics because Confucianism has its own tradition of metaphysics, but does the reconstruction of metaphysics definitely mean that of Confucianism to a Chinese? And can Confucianism be left alone when a metaphysic is reconstructed? These questions are derived from another question: dose metaphysics have its nationality?

Metaphysics at least used to be historically something of nationality. This fact involves one more question, that is, the question of a “historical horizon”. Because the issues will be discussed next, here we have to cut the long story short: the “timeliness” of Dasein determines the inevitability of a “historical” horizon, and the historicalness determines the inescapability of the concept of “history”. As a Chinese tradition, Confucianism is not something “ready at hand”, therefore not the exhibits displayed in a museum of history; as a Chinese tradition, as the thrown so-being of the Chinese people, Confucianism instantly realized in our real life. Therefore, the reconstruction of Confucianism indicates exactly the “ability to be” of us as the Chinese people. Concerning nationality, I always emphasized that the issue of modernity is in essence an issue of nationality. What the so-called modernity involves is nothing more than the concept of “nationality” since the early modern times. In this sense, nationality is the fundamental connotation of modernity. Conceptually, the so-called nationality involves the subjectivity of a nation in the first place, which immediately points at the culture and tradition of a nation. As I have pointed out, the modernization in the West has experienced the transformation of ideas, but it carried forward the Greek and Hebrew traditions after all; in contrast, the Chinese liberals always fail just because they go another way around, completely rejecting the tradition and upholding a thorough westernization (Huang, 2000).

2.3 How do we reconstruct Confucianism?

If it is our “mission” to reconstruct Confucianism, then the problem is how to do it. I have clearly indicated that I choose phenomenology as a reference. Therefore, what I have to explain at first is why phenomenology is chosen as a reference for the reconstruction of Confucianism.

First, the issue of “modern mainstay philosophies”. Modern philosophies consist of three great movements: the movement of analytic philosophy, the movement of phenomenology, and the movement of post-modernism. However, we will not consider post-modernism because it is “anti-metaphysical” and is therefore contrary to our intention. I will not go with analytic philosophy either, because it is not only “anti-metaphysical”, but also something of scientism. Analytic philosophy takes mathematics, logic and sciences—empiricism and logicism—as its foundation, but they need foundations themselves. Therefore, we have no other choices but phenomenology, especially the phenomenology developed by Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger, not as “philosophy”, but as “methodology”.

Second, the issue of “Chinese and Western comparative philosophy”. The above discussion involves another question: why does the reconstruction of Confucianism in China have to take Western phenomenology as a reference? This is a serious topic which has constantly stung the nerves of some nationalists. This is a very big topic; here I can only mention a few considerations.

(a) Suppose we completely refuse any “Western concepts” (as everyone knows, it is impossible to the Chinese people toady), we would try to “interpret on our own” the traditional texts. However, what does it mean? Obviously, it would mean a hermeneutic context. Then what does it imply if we take into account the basic idea of the contemporary philosophical hermeneutic? It implies that the tradition is not anything “ready at hand”; its within our interpretation. Then, how are we qualified to interpret, what is the source by means of which we interpret the classical texts? It lies in our perception of immediate existence and life.

(b) It is true not only to the classical texts in China, but also to the texts in the West. Talking about the so-called “theory of Chinese people’s ‘aphasia’,” I made the following remarks. “From the point of view of modern philosophical hermeneutics, the so-called ‘aphasia’ is impossible at all. For, apparently, one of the premises of ‘aphasia’ is that we can accept pure original foreign languages and their concepts in getting in touch with the foreign languages, or can accept pure original traditional languages and their concepts in coming into contact with the traditional languages; only in the first case can we suffer from ‘aphasia’, and only in the latter case can we evade it. However, as we know, the idea itself held by those who asserted ‘aphasia’ is exactly a traditional idea out of date. According to the idea of modern philosophical hermeneutic, the acceptance of what is pure and original is impossible at all” (Huang, 2004, p. 4). We cannot accept the so-called original Chinese tradition, nor can we accept the so-called original Western ideas. We are interpreting as we translate, and we have already been interpreting even when we read the “original texts” before translation. The abundant sources of interpretation still rest in our immediate existence, or our immediate understanding of life that we regard as “primordial experiences”. Therefore, such expression as the “comparison of Chinese and Western philosophies”—including my title “a comparative study on Confucianism and phenomenology”—has become trite, and such parlance suggests as if there exist a “Chinese” and a “West” that are objective and available for us to compare.

(c) Therefore, the so-called “comparison of Confucianism and phenomenology” does not mean to discuss Confucianism using the notions of phenomenology; instead, it suggests making Confucianism and phenomenology dialogue in immediate “intercourse”. As a “fusion of horizons”, the result of these dialogues is certainly neither the existing phenomenology in the West, nor the existing traditional Confucianism. As a tradition to be interpreted, Confucianism will definitely change its horizon due to the presence of phenomenology; likewise, phenomenology will also occur as a certain kind of interpreted tradition and change its horizon due to the presence of Confucianism. For that matter, may the “reconstruction of Confucianism” be the “reconstruction of phenomenology”? Then, can we expect the birth of “phenomenological Confucianism” or even “Confucian phenomenology”?

Now I formally start my topic, and the development of the topic is based on the following preparatory ideas.

3 Several preparatory ideas
3.1 The idea of phenomenology

There is no consensus on the “idea of phenomenology”, of course. Although we say “back to the things themselves”, people come to no agreement on what is “things themselves”. My following presentation will mainly involve three German phenomenologists: Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger. Their ideas differ greatly, but I will go all out to “unify” them in the following way: (1) Heidegger helped me destruct a certain kind of Confucianism, in particular, the traditional metaphysics of Confucianism after Confucius and Mencius, i.e. after the Axial Period, and reduce it to a more “primordial” Confucianism, actually a certain original experience of existence in Heidegger’s words, which I call “original perception of life”; (2) as with this significant source, some of Husserl’s approaches might be taken as a reference to help me reconstruct the metaphysics of Confucianism, and this reconstruction is based on xinxue 心学 (Learning of Mind), a branch school of Confucianism, as a kernel resource; (3) however, we also need Scheler to be a medium between these two philosophers if we want to grasp the core of Confucianism, which is nothing more than “benevolence”.

Then, Heidegger has offered a general referential structure, and the references to Husserl and Scheler are merely links in this structure:

A. destruction: to deconstruct metaphysical Confucianism (After the Axial Period) (taking Heidegger as a reference);

B. reduction: to reduce to the primordial ontological Confucianism (the Axial Period) (taking Heidegger as a reference); and

C. reconstruction: to reconstruct Confucianism:

a. Confucian doctrine of existence—the perception of life (compared with Heidegger);

b. Confucian doctrine of benevolence—(compared with Scheler); and

c. Confucian ontology—(compared with Husserl).

For taking phenomenology as “destruction → reduction → reconstruction”, I considered Sun Zhouxing’s idea, “Heidegger thought that phenomenology was a kind of ontological methodology which has three basic links: ‘reduction of phenomenology’, ‘construction of phenomenology’ and ‘destruction of phenomenology’” (Sun, 1996, p. 3). What has to be explained here is that the destruction (Destruktion) of Heidegger was different from the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida. The destruction of Heidegger means to reduce metaphysics to the original experiences of existence; but academically, it does not intend to refuse any metaphysics, but lay a foundation for it.[1]

Apparently, Heidegger’s thought is especially valuable as a reference to the reconstruction of Confucianism. It does not suggest that the reconstructed Confucianism is nothing more than a copy of Heidegger’s thought. This involves another significant question: the relationship between the Confucianism and Heidegger’s thought (Huang, 2005, (4)). As everyone knows, Heidegger has suggested his famous “ontological difference”, i.e. the difference of “Being (Sein)” and “beings (Seiendes)”; but he has also brought forward another difference, that is, the difference of “Being” and “existence (Existenz)”. In his early thought, we can take the course of Dasein and the existence of Dasein to approach Being itself on the one hand; but on the other hand, in no way we can say that “existence” is just the “Being itself”. That is to say, “existence” and “being” are not the same in Heidegger’s eyes. Only in this way was it possible for Heidegger in his later period to change his direction, i.e. rejecting the course of “existence” and trying to directly talk about “Being”. This involves not only Heidegger’s change of direction, but also one fundamental difference between Confucianism and Heidegger: according to Confucianism, the so-called “Being itself” distinct from “existence” is nothing but something senseless; the statements that “the great virtue both of the Heaven and the Earth means procreation” and that “Continuing procreation means yi 易 (change, the most fundamental concept in the Book of Changes)” (Yi·Xicizhuan) indicate that life is Being and there is no “Being” outside life. Heidegger in his later period gave up his effort to go from the “existence of Dasein” into “Being”, but what we value more is exactly his ontology of Dasein in his early period.

3.2 Ideas of history

Actually, the above analysis of “deconstruction” has involved an idea of history. As we usually understand, to Heidegger, this kind of history is merely a manifestation of the popular concept of time. However, the question is not so simple. Heidegger’s actual thought is that it is necessary to understand the historicity of the existence of Dasein if we want to understand the idea of history; and it is necessary to understand the timeliness of Dasein if we want to understand the historical context; yet it can be viewed conversely: timeliness lays a foundation for historicity, and the historicity of existence lays a foundation for history. Therefore, the final answer to the question why history is possible is the timeliness of Dasein. Only in this way did Heidegger highlight the importance of history. As he said, philosophically the primary matter is not a theory that constructs the concept of history, or a theory of historical knowledge, or a historical theory of historical objects. The primary matter is to explain the historicity of authentic beings in the history, but the Dasein itself is “historic”; therefore, a thorough ontological interpretation of this being will necessarily become a historical interpretation. Therefore, the characteristic of the inquiry of Being itself is historicity. As a historical inquiry, this inquiry contains an instruction in its most original meaning of Being: to inquire the history of the inquiry itself, that is, to be historical (Heidegger 1999b, pp. 13, 25, 46). Only in this way did Heidegger put forward his “back steps” (der Schritt zurück), i.e. historically returning to the ancient Greece, to Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle. These are the preparatory ideas for the making up of the detailed outline in the book Being and Time (Heidegger, 1999b, p. 47).

3.3 The idea of Axial Period

Then, Jaspers’ philosophy of history can enter our sight. Heidegger praised his friend Jaspers highly while he criticized the latter (Heidegger 2000). However, so far as I know, Heidegger did not explicitly combine his ontological thought with Jaspers’ idea of the “Axial Period”. But this combination will be very interesting to me. Considering the Chinese and Western histories of ideas, we can understand the corresponding relationship between Heidegger and Jaspers as the following:

before the Axial Period—before the Western Zhou Dynasty
 before the ancient Greek philosophies—pre-metaphysics
 
the Axial Period—during the Western Zhou Dynasty, the Autumn and Spring and Warring States Periods
 the ancient Greek and Roman philosophies—the construction of metaphysics
 
after the Axial Period—since the Qin and Han dynasties
 since the Middle Ages—the times of metaphysics
 

The right column refers to the times of “history”, while the left one deals with the relationship of laying foundations between different ideas, which have nothing to do with eras, so how can it correspond to the right column? This reveals one important idea of Heidegger’s phenomenology: the issue of times is an issue of history, and the issue of relationship of foundations is an issue of ontology; and the links between them are like this: the timeliness of Dasein → historicity → history. This is also a kind of relationship of foundations. One will have to understand the historicity of existence if he wants to understand historical ideas; and he will have to understand the temporality of Dasein if he is to grasp the historical contexts. Therefore, for an author of a text, he is merely a temporal being; but meanwhile, as an existence of Dasein, he is also a historical being with his temporality and historicity. Therefore, his thought is not always so pure and simple. That was especially evident to the people during the Axial Period. It was in this way that Heidegger grasped Plato and especially Aristotle when he analyzed them: they were speakers for the perception and interpretation of the original being, and at the same time the founders of metaphysics. We should hold the same attitude towards Confucius and Mencius. Judging from their comparative positions in the history of ideas, the spectrum of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle was just like that of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi if we can say that Heraclitus of Ephesus in the West exactly resembled Laozi in the East. Of course, these kinds of “resemblance” merely mean the correspondence at the level of ideas.

4 Destruction of Confucian metaphysics
It is with reference to the above phenomenological-historical structure of ideas that I put forward the following view points.

4.1 The new doctrine of “Three-stage Confucianism”

Modern Neo-Confucianism has brought forward a doctrine of “Three-stage Confucianism”. Here, I develop a new doctrine of “Three-stage Confucianism”:

A. primordial Confucianism (before the Qin Dynasty) (the Axial Period)

a. the Western Zhou Dynasty Period: the original texts of the Wujing 五经 (the Five Classics)

b. the Spring and Autumn Period: Confucius’ thought

c. the Warring States Period: Zengzi, Zisi, Mencius, and Xunzi

B. degrading Confucianism (In the ancient and modern times)

a. the arbitrary Confucianism in the ancient times

b. Confucianism in the modern times

C. the reconstructed Confucianism (At present and in the future)

The arrangement of these stages implies that the Confucianism after Confucius and Mencius, i.e. after the Axial Period, was largely a metaphysical Confucianism that should be deconstructed; we must return to Confucius and Mencius to see how they constructed Confucianism on the basis of the original understanding of life. Only thus can we know how to reconstruct Confucianism on the basis of the original sources of our immediate life forms.

4.2 The metaphysical nature both of ancient and modern Confucianism Apparently, both the Neo-Confucianism in the Song Dynasty and the modern Neo-Confucianism are metaphysical Confucianism. Here are two fundamental marks: the beings-as-a-whole, which is the final foundation of all beings, or the “beings as beings”, are represented as the absolute subjectivity of the ultimate entity (Heidegger, 1999a, p. 68; 76). In the West, the most classical expression of this is Hegel’s famous statement that “substance is subject”; and this substance or subject is nothing more than the beings as a whole that are the ultimate foundation of all beings, i.e. the “absolute idea” (Hegel, 1979, p. 15). Whereas, for the Confucians in China, the foundation for all beings is mainly “xin” 心 (mind), “xing” 性 (nature), and li 理 (principles) in the Neo-Confucianism in Song and Ming Dynasties, and is mainly the “moral subject” in some modern Neo-Confucians such as Mou (1968).

4.3 How is the Confucianism as metaphysics possible?

The metaphysical construction of Confucianism itself has its own source, but the question is whether we have realized it or not. This is the fundamental difference between the Confucianism of Confucius and Mencius and the Confucianism after the Axial Period.

In the contemporary context, it is such a question: how is metaphysics possible? It was a question asked by Kant, that is, the question of the “foundation of metaphysics” (Kant 1997, pp. 41–42); but still, Kant answered this question from the perspective of metaphysics, i.e. he summarized it as the function of “reason”, the function of the “mind” of a subject. Moreover, Heidegger asked another question: how is the subjectivity itself possible? Metaphysics presupposes that the subjectivity is a “self-evident” premise, but this subjectivity is still implicit (Heidegger, 1996). As with Confucianism, we may also ask how the things such as mind (xin), nature (xing) and principles (li) are possible. To this question, two answers were offered in history. (1) “What is bestowed from the Heaven is called the nature” (Zhongyong), and “the ultimate source of the Dao is the Heaven” (Dong Zhongshu, Ju Xianliang Duice 举贤良对策 (Recommendations for the Selection of Worthies and Talents). This was an exterior “heaven”. However, still the “heaven” was an idea of the “beings as a whole” or the “ultimate foundation”, so we can continue to ask how this “heaven” was possible. The reply was that the “heaven” was natural—it is what it is by itself. (2) The xing (nature) is the Heaven, an intrinsic “heaven”, that is, a “nature” that is so by itself. From here we see the transformation of ideas from Zisi to Mencius.

However, there is still a question: how to understand this “nature” that is so by itself. Here are two possible explanations. (1) An a priori explanation: one example is Husserl’s “self-givenness”. This idea was derived from Descartes: the originality of an idea comes from self-evidentness (Descartes), and the self-evidentness from self-givenness (Husserl). Actually, it was also a mode of explanation of the orthodoxy xinxue 心学 (Learning of Mind, a Neo-Confucian school usually thought to be started and represented by Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming) from Mencius to Wang Yangming and finally to Mou Zongsan. (2) An existentialist explanation: for example, the grasp of “Dasein” as a being, as Heidegger said. Nature is not a being or a thing, whereas the “nature (xing)” and “principles (li)” as substantiality and subjectivity are both a being and a thing. How is it possible? According to Heidegger, there is another word that can denote “Being (eon)” in German, i.e. physis (usually translated as “nature”, in Chinese it can be translated as “original being”). This word means self-blossoming emergence (e.g., the blossoming of a rose), opening up, un-folding, that which manifests itself in such a process of unfolding and perseveres and endures in it (Heidegger, 1987, p. 11). That is the “Being itself”. And to Confucianism, the Being itself is just the life itself.

5 Reduction to primordial Confucianism
From the above discussion we see that we have to reduce Confucianism, or in Heidegger’s words, we have to “step back”. We have to step back from the time after the Axial Period to the Axial Period, and even from the Axial Period to the time before the Axial Period. As for the Axial Period, we have to return from Yizhuan 易传 (Commentaries on the Book of Changes) and Xunzi to Mencius and Zisi, and then to Confucius.

5.1 Xunzi’s theory of human nature (xingxue): the establishment of ethics and the foundation of epistemology

The Confucians were separated into eight divisions after Confucius, the most important of those were undoubtedly the two branches represented by Mencius and Xunzi: they respectively actualized some possibilities contained in Confucius’ thoughts. They had something in common, which was to lay much emphasis on li 礼 (rituals), i.e. the issues of ethical norms; but their basic presuppositions for the theories of human nature in these ethical norms seemed to be poles apart, i.e. the presupposition that “nature is good” and the presupposition that “nature is evil”. Typically, Mencius directly promoted the subjectivity of morality to be the metaphysical absolute subjectivity, constructing the ontology of morality of Confucians. However, Xunzi did the contrary: in his doctrine, the subject of morality was not metaphysicalized, instead, it was de-metaphysicalized and turned out to be the result of “teaching” and “learning”, the result of the “cultivation of the nature for its transformation” (Xunzi·Xinge).

However, Xunzi’s theory of human nature (xing) had gone much farther than that. People merely noticed his idea of nature in the ethical sense, but neglected his concept of nature in the epistemological sense. Among the Confucians, in fact, Xunzi was the first to put forward an epistemological “subject-object” structure, “What knows is the nature of human beings, and what is known is the principles of objects” (Xunzi·Jiebi). Such a theoretical structure of “the nature of human beings vs. the principles of objects” was exactly the typical epistemological “subject-object” structure. As we know, such a “subject-object” structure is a fundamental foundation for all the theories of knowledge. The very reason that we step back to Xunzi at the first place is that we want to resolve the following problems --- How was the Confucian epistemology established? Why is Mou Zongsan’s theory of “self-give-up of conscience” unnecessary? What is its ontological foundation? What should we think about its idea of “nature (xing)”? And most importantly, how was such metaphysical concept of “nature” derived from the understanding of life, the fundamental source in the doctrine of Xunzi?

5.2 Mencius’ theory of mind: the establishment of subjectivity and the foundation of ethics

Mencius’ time is earlier than Xunzi’s; therefore, he upheld more original ideas than Xunzi did. Mencius, or to say, the “School of Zisi and Mencius”, constructed the metaphysical system of the “Xin Xing Lun 心性论 (Doctrine of Mind and Nature)” or the “Xing Xue 心学 (Learning of Mind)”; but different from the Confucian metaphysics after the Axial Period, it was well based (Mencius·Lilouxia).

Mencius’ thoughts were most fully manifested during the Axial Period when Confucianism was transforming from the original phenomenological concepts to participated phenomenological ones: he had finally constructed the normative system of Confucian ethics. Here, the “nature of benevolence” was the subjectivity of morality, which was based on the metaphysical “learning of mind” in the Confucian tradition that he had constructed; in the “learning of mind”, the “nature of benevolence” was a metaphysical absolute subjectivity (Heidegger, 1999a, p. 76). All these came from his understanding of “benevolence” as the feeling of life in the original contexts of life itself, such as the “feeling of sympathy” and the “feeling of pitifulness”.

For example, according to Mencius, benevolence as an “original phenomenon” is expressed in three patterns: loving parents and relatives, benevolence to people (kindness to people) and kindness to thing (Part I, Jin-xin, Mencius). We used to take them as a result of extending one’s self-love to others or extending the love of human to the love of things. Actually, there are two points that we should pay attention.

First, the foundation of the “extending” is not the existing things such as “family ethics” or “patriarchal clan ethics”, but the perception of life in the appearance of life itself. The sequent generations who attacked Confucianism as “feudal ethics” typically forgot the being—they forgot life itself.

Second, Mencius developed the idea of “benevolence” that was even more original, or even more “universal,” which had nothing to do with blood relation, and this idea was closer to life itself. For instance, Mencius depicted such an original situation:

Seeing a child who is about to fall into a well, any person will be fearful, watchful, sympathetic, and pitiful… therefore, those without the feeling of sympathy and pitifulness are not human beings, those without the feeling of shame and dislike are not human beings, those without the feeling of polite declination are not human beings, and those who cannot tell the good from the evil are not human beings. The feeling of sympathy and pitifulness means the initiation of benevolence; the feeling of shame and dislike means the initiation of righteousness, the feeling of polite declination means the initiation of rituals, and the feeling of good and evil means the initiation of wisdom… Because the four initiations are available to me, I am aware of them, and thus develop and amplify them. They are just like the kindling of fire or the source of a spring. If they are amplified, they can sufficiently safeguard the country; if not, one even cannot wait on his parents (Part I, Gong-sun Chou, Mencius).

Here we see a hierarchy of ideas. First, the original idea that is like the “source of spring” is the feelings of “fearfulness, watchfulness, sympathy, and pitifulness” which as the emotions in life precedes any beings. It is the “initiatives” of the concepts of “benevolence, righteousness, rituals, and wisdom”. Second, it is on this origin that the subjective “human” is given, and then it is possible to construct metaphysics through the “extension and amplification” of the initiatives.

Finally, only under these conditions is it possible to participate in the ethical and political activities such as “to wait on parents” and “to defend the country”.

5.3 Confucius’ learning of benevolence: originality—possibility

To return to Confucius is to return to the most original expressions of Confucianism. So to speak, Confucius was not “perfect” or “pure” in terms of his theoretical constructions. The very reason is that Confucius talked more often about the fundamental origin and source. For example, Confucius did not develop any fixed parlance of “benevolence” just because he had not substantialized or materialized “benevolence”, and had not objectified, conceptualized or specialized “benevolence”. Therefore, in my opinion, Confucius was great not because he was a pure metaphysician or a pure existentialist. He was not a pure metaphysician, so we cannot metaphysicalize him as people did in the study of the “history of Chinese physiology” in the past; and he was not a pure existentialist, hence we cannot regard him as another Heidegger as some scholars do today. Confucius was great just because of his “impurity”, because of the abundance of his hierarchy of ideas: on the basis of life source, he made possible the construction of metaphysics as well as ethics and epistemology. That was the very reason that it was possible for Mencius and Xunzi to consequently complete their constructions.

6 Reconstruction of Confucianism
The significance of the above “deconstruction-reduction” of the history of ideas does not lie in history as a discipline, but in the Chinese theory of existence — Confucian “theory of life”. What we mean is to return to life and reconstruct Confucianism. In the historical explanation of the history of ideas, what is revealed to us is how, starting from our immediate life, we should reconstruct Confucianism, reconstruct metaphysics as well as ethics and epistemology, and even reconstruct all the norms and institutions.

6.1 Confucian theory of life: how is benevolence possible?

Doubtlessly, benevolence is the starting point of the entire Confucian thoughts. However, the existing explanations about “benevolence” have met enormous theoretical difficulties. For example, if benevolence is a kind of feeling, it does not belong to ontological category, because according to the Confucian metaphysical idea that “the nature (xing, 性) means the form (ti, 体), and feelings (qing, 情), the functions (yong, 用)”, the noumenon is the “nature” instead of “feelings”; if benevolence is a noumenon, it is not feelings. However, if so, how to understand such apparently emotional descriptions as the “feeling of sympathy” or the “feeling of pitifulness”?

In essence, such a so-called “contradiction” emerges because people do not understand the inherent relationship of laying foundation of the Confucian concept “benevolence”: benevolence as a noumenon is a primordial category of metaphysics, and indicates the establishment of the metaphysical concept of subjectivity in the Confucian tradition. However, it is based on the feeling of humanity, this feeling is itself a phenomenon of existence. Therefore, the key point in the explanation of Confucianism lies in how to answer this question: how is the benevolence as noumenon or subjectivity possible?

The feeling of benevolence as a phenomenon of existence is not only different from the modern “animal ethics”, but also from Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit such as Sorge and fear. Moreover, the Confucian idea of “benevolence” is different from Scheler’s phenomenology of feelings of “love,” because Scheler’s community of love is guaranteed by the personalization of God (Scheler, 1999; 2004), whereas the benevolence of Confucianism is the feeling of life as a “primordial phenomenon” or “original phenomenon”. Nevertheless, as “a thing itself”, benevolence is not a substantial being, but an original situation. Confucius and Mencius both talked a lot on this issue. Therefore, the reconstruction of Confucianism means at the first place to return to life itself, to the feeling of life, and to the original love itself.

6.2 Confucian metaphysics: how are the nature (xing) and principles (li) possible?

The Confucian metaphysics is constructed on the basis of the “learning of nature and principles (xing li xue 性理学)”. The lixue 理学 (a Neo-Confucianism represented by the Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi in the Song Dynasty) and the xinxue of the Neo-Confucians during the Song and Ming dynasties shared a common view, i.e., they recognized the “principles of the nature (xing li 性理)”.

Therefore, the “principles of the nature” was a cornerstone concept for the Confucians to construct their metaphysical systems. However, as it has been made clear above, it is far from being the most primordial foundational idea, not the “primordial given”. The “principles of the nature” as a category of metaphysical noumenon were also expressed as “benevolence” at times, then how was such “benevolence” or “principles of the nature” possible? For Confucians, the things themselves as “primordially given” are just benevolence as the primordial phenomena of life and the feeling of life. The establishment of the idea of “principles of the nature” is only a result of objectification, substantialization and ontologicalization the feeling of benevolence as primordial phenomena. It is necessary to the construction of metaphysics, but at the same time, it may prevent benevolence from “being so by itself”, from self-appearing. However, in Confucius, there is indeed a dimension of the original emergence of the feeling of benevolence.

Today we absolutely do not intend to return or revive the already shaped concepts of the Confucian metaphysics after the Axial Period; if we do so, we would be no more than some “Confucian fundamentalists”. We have to reject the claim of “complete westernization” indeed, because it does not conform to the national style of living in the present China; and also we have to reject Confucian fundamentalism because it doest not comply with the living style of modernity in today’s China.

The reconstruction of Confucian metaphysics means the reconstruction of subjectivity at the first place. The question is what kind of subjectivity is to be reconstructed. Is it a subjectivity of collectivism or a subjectivity of individualism? Or is it possible to construct another kind of subjectivity? All these questions are fundamental, but still in considering these questions we have to return to the “thing itself” at first—return to life itself. This involves problems of “modernity” and even “post-modern conditions”, let alone the “original” feeling and understanding of life in this kind of living style.

6.3 Are ethics and sciences possible according to Confucianism?

According to Heidegger, not only sciences but also ethics were based on philosophical metaphysics (Heidegger, 2002). As a matter of fact, ethics in the traditional sense is also a science. Sciences are based on philosophy because the latter delimits the basic range (the realm of being) of beings through a table of category; whereas sciences take these ranges of beings as their premise, that is, takes certain range of beings as their corresponding objects (Heidegger, 1999b, p. 11). Therefore, ontology is a precondition for sciences. In this sense, any “anti-metaphysical” scientism or post-modern thought cannot do without its own metaphysics.

Then, how about Confucian metaphysics? In history, it was the Zisi-Mencius school, or more particularly, it was Mencius, who completed the construction of Confucian metaphysics. Starting from “benevolence”, Mencius constructed the basic metaphysical structure of “benevolence-righteousness-rituals-wisdom”. So long as we do not forget the level at which benevolence is manifested, this metaphysical structure of Mencius will be very meaningful. As it has been mentioned above, metaphysics become possible when the feeling of benevolence as an original phenomenon is metaphysically grasped as a noumenon. As a noumenon, benevolence is expressed in many ways in Chinese, such as nature, sincerity, mind, principles, qi and the Dao. In Frege’s words, all these different names have the same referent but express different senses (Frege, 1892; 1998). Here, we simply list the most representative classical texts that specified these symbols as noumena: nature—Zisi-Mencius school, sincerity — Zhongyong 中庸, mind—Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming’s xinxue 心学 (Learning of Mind), Principles—Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi’s lixue (Learning of Principles), qi—Zhang Zai, and the Dao—almost all the texts. If the modern Neo-Confucians are added, there will be more symbols, including “mind” (Tang) and “subject of morality” (Mou). They all point at the same thing, that is, the “beings as the beings” as the ultimate foundation of all beings. It is the very thing that guarantees the presence of all beings: for example, the “origin” in the cosmological model guarantees the possibility of the relationship between the “essential” and the “participated”, the “essence” in ontology guarantees the possibility of the relationship between the “forms” and their “functions”. Either sciences or ethics are established through this guarantee.

A. Benevolence, righteousness and rituals: ethics a. Benevolence: Confucian theory of human nature

The theory of human nature is denied today as a metaphysical idea, but in fact, the establishment of ethics depends on the theory of human nature. Therefore, it is necessary to reconstruct the theory of human nature. Philosophically, the theory of human nature is in essence an embodiment of metaphysical absolute subjectivity in relative subjectivity. However, we need first of all to make clear such a problem: how is this kind of subjectivity of morality given in the feeling of life as an origin? For Confucians, this is the problem of “benevolence”.

a. Benevolence: Confucian theory of source

The concept of “benevolence” in the tradition of Confucianism is used at three different levels of ideas, among which we see relationships of laying foundations: first, love itself as the original feeling of life; second, the “nature (xing)” as the primordial category in a metaphysical structure, that is, absolute subjectivity; and third, the “goodness” as the feeling of morality and the principles of morality, i.e., the relative “goodness” in the sense of theory of values (not the “absolute goodness as a noumenon).This goodness supposed as human nature is known as ai xin 爱心 (mind of love) in modern Chinese. For the reconstruction of Confucianism, the reconstruction of ethics is a matter as such: as human nature, the “mind of love” is neither given by Xunzi’s empiricism, nor the Mencius’ apriorism, instead, it is revealed in the original situation of life itself.

b. Righteousness: Confucian theory of justice

As we know, the construction of norms and the design of institution are regulated by some principle of justice, therefore, the theory of justice means a foundation for the theory of norm and the theory of institution. The kernel concept in the Confucian theory of justice is nothing more than “righteousness”.

Righteousness is merely an ethical principle that is purely formal, which only tells us that our behaviors should be just, legitimate, fair, impartial, appropriate and proper. The very reason why our behaviors can be so depends on such a relationship of laying foundations: on the one hand, it is substantiated by the construction of norms to which it offers a foundation, in other words, the formal principle of “righteousness” is embodied in the substantial contents of “rituals”; on the other hand, “righteousness” itself is based on “benevolence” if we get to the root of the matter, in other words, it is based on life itself, on the feeling of life.

Naturally, this latter aspect brings forward an extremely significant connotation of the Confucian doctrine of justice: timely righteousness—timely appropriateness. The timely appropriateness of righteousness is expressed as “yushi xiexing 与时偕行 (going as time goes)” (Tuanzhuan, I Ching). That was just what Mencius meant when he said that Confucius was a “saint appropriate to his times” (Part II, Wanzhang, Mencius). This is the very reason why Confucius brought forward the principle of “addition and deletion” of “rituals” (Wei Zheng, the Analects). “The superior man, in the world, does not set his mind either for anything, or against anything; what is right he will follow” (Lunyu·Liren). This is the idea that a superior man “considers righteousness to be essential” and “holds righteousness to be of highest importance” (Weilinggong and Yanghuo, the Analects).

c. Rituals: Confucian theory of norms and institutions

In the Confucian tradition, “rituals” is an umbrella term that refers to all the social norms involving morality, politics, economy, law, and so on. The construction of such norms is a precondition of the designing of institutions, and these norms themselves are based on the principle of justice. Thus, if the principle of justice itself is derived from the feeling of life, the construction of norms is derived from the feeling of life, too. That is to say, the construction of norms of “rituals” must meet the requirement of “timely righteousness”— the principle of timely appropriateness. That is the principle of “addition and deletion” of “rituals” put forward by Confucius.

Moreover, if “righteousness” is a purely formal principle, “rituals” as norms are both formal and substantial. Then there will be a question: now that “rituals” are based on the pure formal principle of “righteousness”, then where is its substantiality derived from? Obviously, the substantiality of “rituals” is derived from the preceding “benevolence”, while “benevolence”— as discussed earlier — is first of all the original feeling of life. As the feeling of life and love, benevolence is both formal and substantial. In fact, it does matter if it is formal or substantial, because it is the source of all formal and substantial things.

Therefore, the reconstruction of Confucian theories of norms and institutions differs not only from the ideas of norms and institutions developed in the modern enlightenment thoughts in the West, but also from the traditional ideas after the Axial Period in China.

B. Wisdom: theory of knowledge

As mentioned above, the establishment of the Confucian theory of knowledge can be dated back to Xunzi. Xunzi’s ideas provide an important source for the reconstruction of Confucianism in terms of epistemology. Epistemology is developed on the basis of the dualistic “subject-object” structure, while the latter is based on subjectivity, i.e. the so-called “nature (xing)” in the Confucian tradition.

a. The duality of “nature”

People will think of the “theory of the original evilness of human nature” whenever they speak of Xunzi. As mentioned above, it is actually a great misunderstanding. Xunzi talked about “nature” in two senses: one is ethical, which is the theory of the original evilness of human nature; and the other is in the sense of the theory of knowledge, which may be called the “theory of nature free of good and evil.” In the latter sense, Xunzi developed the “subject-object” structure as the basis of the theory of knowledge, in particular, he discussed the “nature” in the cognitive sense instead of the ethical sense, “Therefore, knowledge is called knowledge as it is knowledge of people, and it is called wisdom when it is applied to something; and likewise, capability is called capability as it is a capability of people, but it is called power when it is exerted on something” (Zheng Ming, Xunzi). Here the phrase “of people” suggests a subject, and the expression “to/on something” implies objects. From the point of view of a subject, this is “nature”—“knowledge and capability” (wisdom and power). Therefore, he said that “generally, what knows is the nature of human beings, and what can be known is the principles of objects” (Jie Bi, Xunzi). This is the “subject-object” structure developed by Xunzi, i.e. human nature—physical principles. Such a structure has a universal, permanent, and fundamental significance to the construction of theory of knowledge.

b. Duality of “knowledge”

However, in Mencius’ structure of “benevolence—righteousness—rituals—wisdom”, this wisdom has dual aspects: one is the objective wisdom. Similar to Xunzi’s idea, this is a precondition of epistemological construction. The other is the “reflective” knowledge, a Confucian-style “self-reflection”—reflecting “rituals”, “righteousness” and even “benevolence”. This is the meaning expressed by the sentence that “it is the most pleasure for one to reflect himself and be sincere” (Part II, Jin Xin, Mencius). This “knowledge” is a kind of “intuition”, but it is not empirical; instead, merely from the point of view of reflection on “benevolence”, it means to return from the concrete “rituals” to the metaphysical being as “benevolence,” and that is what it means to say that “all things are available in me” (Part II, Jin Xin, Mencius). So to speak, it is a kind of “transcendental intuition,” but a further return means the return to the original contexts of feeling of life or of life itself, which can be called an “original intuition.” This self-reflective cognition is known as “conscience”. I can summarize the above discussion in a few words: to return to life and reconstruct Confucianism.

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[1] Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 27. Talking about his “destruction”, Heidegger clearly opposed the deconstruction that led to relativism in ontological issues, and opposed the bad relativization of an ontological position. Heidegger specifi ed that he did not intend to shake off the passive meaning of ontological tradition through his work of destruction, instead, his work of destruction aimed at indicating a variety of positive possibilities of the ontological tradition; that the task of analysis did not deny the past, instead, it targeted the dominating patterns in the history of ontology; and that this work of destruction did not plan to bury the past into nothingness, instead, it had its positive purposes.